The Amsterdam Auction

The Amsterdam auction has been used to sell real estate in the Dutch capital for centuries. By awarding a premium to the highest losing bidder, the Amsterdam auction favors weak bidders without having the implementation difficulties of Myerson's (1981) optimal auction. In a series of experiment...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Econometrica 2004-01, Vol.72 (1), p.281-294
Hauptverfasser: Goeree, Jacob K., Offerman, Theo
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The Amsterdam auction has been used to sell real estate in the Dutch capital for centuries. By awarding a premium to the highest losing bidder, the Amsterdam auction favors weak bidders without having the implementation difficulties of Myerson's (1981) optimal auction. In a series of experiments, we compare the standard first-price and English auctions, the optimal auction, and two variants of the Amsterdam auction. With strongly asymmetric bidders, the second-price Amsterdam auction raises substantially more revenues than standard formats and only slightly less than the optimal auction.
ISSN:0012-9682
1468-0262
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00484.x