Selective non-proliferation or universal regimes?

A clear choice has been presented by Marianne Hanson (2005) and Michael Wesley (2005): the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is either too important to ignore and must be strengthened, or it is too dangerous to persevere with and must be replaced by a new regime. There are clear and compelling merits to both of these arguments, but they share a key assumption that the answer to the problems posed by nuclear weapons and proliferation in the twenty-first century can be dealt with through a universal regime: ie, either a strengthened version of the current one or a brand new one to replace it. This assumption is challenged by what appears to be happening in the evolution and employment of contemporary non-proliferation and counter-proliferation strategies. The key trend, promoted by the United States but also being adopted by other members of the international community, is towards a selective, caseby- case approach to proliferation which utilises a different mix of instruments depending on the proliferator (or potential proliferator) involved. It is difficult to see this trend being reversed (and either of the competing hopes of Hanson and Wesley being realised) without some sort of major crisis which leads states to the brink of nuclear catastrophe-or the actual use of nuclear weapons by panic, inadvertence or malice. But even such a disaster or near miss may still not bring clarity, convergence and commitment around a single instrument.