A variance screen for collusion
In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by 16%, the standard deviation increased by over 200%. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for “pockets” of...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal of industrial organization 2006-05, Vol.24 (3), p.467-486 |
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| container_end_page | 486 |
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| container_title | International journal of industrial organization |
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| creator | Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. Froeb, Luke M. Geweke, John Taylor, Christopher T. |
| description | In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean
decreased by 16%, the standard deviation
increased by over 200%. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for “pockets” of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996–2002. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.10.003 |
| format | Article |
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decreased by 16%, the standard deviation
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decreased by 16%, the standard deviation
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decreased by 16%, the standard deviation
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| ispartof | International journal of industrial organization, 2006-05, Vol.24 (3), p.467-486 |
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| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete |
| subjects | Business economics Collusion Data augmentation Data imputation Economic concentration Empirical tests Firms Gibbs sampling Indicators Industrial organization Kentucky Louisville Market analysis Markov chain Monte Carlo Oil industry Price fixing Price policy Screen U.S.A |
| title | A variance screen for collusion |
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