A variance screen for collusion

A variance screen for collusion

In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by 16%, the standard deviation increased by over 200%. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for “pockets” of...

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Veröffentlicht in:International journal of industrial organization 2006-05, Vol.24 (3), p.467-486
Hauptverfasser: Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M., Froeb, Luke M., Geweke, John, Taylor, Christopher T.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Business economics
Collusion
Data augmentation
Data imputation
Economic concentration
Empirical tests
Firms
Gibbs sampling
Indicators
Industrial organization
Kentucky
Louisville
Market analysis
Markov chain Monte Carlo
Oil industry
Price fixing
Price policy
Screen
U.S.A
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by 16%, the standard deviation increased by over 200%. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for “pockets” of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996–2002.
ISSN:0167-7187
DOI:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.10.003