Political constraints, organization design and performance measurement in China’s state-owned enterprises
This study develops a theoretical model to test how political constraints on labor decisions mediate the effects of economic liberalization forces on aspects of organizational design such as delegation, performance measurement, and incentives in Chinese state-owned enterprises. Hypotheses tests usin...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Accounting, organizations and society organizations and society, 2006-02, Vol.31 (2), p.157-177 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This study develops a theoretical model to test how political constraints on labor decisions mediate the effects of economic liberalization forces on aspects of organizational design such as delegation, performance measurement, and incentives in Chinese state-owned enterprises. Hypotheses tests using a large survey of divisional managers generally confirm the model: that the influence of three liberalization forces (industry level growth and foreign firm competition, joint venture experience and stock market listing) on organization design is mediated by political constraints. |
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ISSN: | 0361-3682 1873-6289 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.aos.2005.01.005 |