Some Contacts Are More Equal than Others: Informal Networks, Job Tenure, and Wages
The explanation typically given for longer tenure among workers who use informal contacts to find jobs is that relatives and friends reduce uncertainty about the quality of the match between worker and employer. An alternative explanation is that workers rely on informal information sources as a las...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of labor economics 2006-04, Vol.24 (2), p.299-318 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The explanation typically given for longer tenure among workers who use informal contacts to find jobs is that relatives and friends reduce uncertainty about the quality of the match between worker and employer. An alternative explanation is that workers rely on informal information sources as a last resort. Such workers remain at their current jobs mainly because they have few alternative choices rather than because of better match quality. This article shows that the two different explanations are simultaneously valid for different types of contacts and can account for differences in the wage effects of job contacts. |
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ISSN: | 0734-306X 1537-5307 |
DOI: | 10.1086/499974 |