Job security in an efficiency wage model

Job security in an efficiency wage model

In a Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model, restrictions on the ability of employers to fire employees caught shirking are shown to reduce employment and raise involuntary unemployment.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of macroeconomics 1993, Vol.15 (1), p.183-187
1. Verfasser: Sjostrom, William
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economic impact
Economic models
Efficiency
Employers
Employment security
Job security
Unemployment
Wage rates
Wages
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In a Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model, restrictions on the ability of employers to fire employees caught shirking are shown to reduce employment and raise involuntary unemployment.
ISSN:0164-0704
1873-152X
DOI:10.1016/0164-0704(93)90061-P