Optimal patent life vs optimal patentability standards

This note considers a new dimension in optimal patent design by treating strategic roles as a policy instrument. It is shown that, contrary to established wisdom, welfare is not always maximized when the Patent Office optimizes over patent life and plays the role of Stackelberg leader. When innovati...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of industrial organization 1992-03, Vol.10 (1), p.81-89
1. Verfasser:	Manna, M. M. A. La
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Economic models Game theory Market equilibrium Summary judgment
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	This note considers a new dimension in optimal patent design by treating strategic roles as a policy instrument. It is shown that, contrary to established wisdom, welfare is not always maximized when the Patent Office optimizes over patent life and plays the role of Stackelberg leader. When innovations are not ‘difficult’, leadership is irrelevant and setting a (high) minimum patentability standard is more valuable than setting patent life.
ISSN:	0167-7187 1873-7986
DOI:	10.1016/0167-7187(92)90049-5