Strategic price discounting and rationing in uniform price auctions

Strategic price discounting and rationing in uniform price auctions

I modify the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders. This allows me to provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion. Moreover, many of the so-called “collusive-seeming” equilibria disappear.

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2009-10, Vol.105 (1), p.23-27
1. Verfasser: Bourjade, Sylvain
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Auctions
Initial public offerings
Ownership
Pricing
Rationing
Uncertainty
Uniform price auctions
Uniform price auctions Rationing Uncertainty Initial public offerings
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:I modify the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders. This allows me to provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion. Moreover, many of the so-called “collusive-seeming” equilibria disappear.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.008