Evolution in Games with a Continuous Action Space

Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the existence of a uniform invasion barrier, local superiority and asymptotic stability relate to each other. This is done without restricting the populations of which we want to investigate the stability t...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic theory 2009-06, Vol.39 (3), p.355-376
Hauptverfasser:	van Veelen, Matthijs, Spreij, Peter
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Asymptotic methods Counterexamples Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Games General topology Mathematical functions Microeconomics Neighborhoods Population Population dynamics Property taxes Public Finance Research Article Social and Behav. Sciences Studies Topological spaces Topological theorems Topology Trajectories
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the existence of a uniform invasion barrier, local superiority and asymptotic stability relate to each other. This is done without restricting the populations of which we want to investigate the stability to monomorphic population states or to strategies with finite support.
ISSN:	0938-2259 1432-0479
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-008-0338-8