Private versus complete information in auctions

Private versus complete information in auctions

We show that, in several (but not all) standard auctions, (i) private independent values and (ii) complete information are payoff equivalent. The first-price auction generates the same revenue under (i) and (ii); the all-pay auction has lower revenue under (ii).

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2008-12, Vol.101 (3), p.214-216
Hauptverfasser: Morath, Florian, Münster, Johannes
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
All-pay auctions
Auction theory
Auctions
Auctions All-pay auctions War of attrition Revenue equivalence Information
Information
Revenue equivalence
War of attrition
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We show that, in several (but not all) standard auctions, (i) private independent values and (ii) complete information are payoff equivalent. The first-price auction generates the same revenue under (i) and (ii); the all-pay auction has lower revenue under (ii).
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.005