Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts

Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts

For any preference profile at which the random serial dictatorship allocation is ordinally inefficient there exists an ordering exchange contract inducing an ordinally efficient random allocation that ordinally dominates the random serial dictatorship allocation.

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Veröffentlicht in:International journal of game theory 2008-03, Vol.36 (3-4), p.489-496
1. Verfasser: Manea, Mihai
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Assignment problem
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Contracts
Dictators
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Endowment
Equilibrium models
Expected utility
Game Theory
Housing
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Pareto optimum
Preferences
Probability
Social and Behav. Sciences
Studies
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:For any preference profile at which the random serial dictatorship allocation is ordinally inefficient there exists an ordering exchange contract inducing an ordinally efficient random allocation that ordinally dominates the random serial dictatorship allocation.
ISSN:0020-7276
1432-1270
DOI:10.1007/s00182-007-0088-z