Timing and Outcome of Legislation: Brazilian Pension Reform in a Bicameral Perspective

In 1995 and 2003, Brazilian Presidents Cardoso and Lula da Silva submitted almost identical pension reform bills to Congress. However, these bills had very different fates in terms of the outcomes of congressional deliberation and the timing of enactment. What explains timing and outcomes of legislation? Using Brazilian pension reform as a case, this article explains legislative timing and outcomes from bicameral and bargaining perspectives. It examines two hypotheses: (1) bicameral incongruence of policy preferences increases the likelihood of legislative gridlock; and (2) impatience accelerates the timing of legislation. Evidence from archival research and interviews with Brazilian legislators strongly support these hypotheses. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 20-23 April 2006, Chicago, Illinois. This research was funded by the National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant in Political Science (Grant No. 0315126), Andrew Mellon Predoctoral Fellowship, and International Studies Fund Research Grant provided through the University Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. The author is grateful to Barry Ames, Gaspare Genna, Mark Hallerberg, Bill Keech, Anibal Perez-Linan, Scott Desposato, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.