Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets
This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or posit...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of public economics 2008-06, Vol.92 (5), p.1531-1539 |
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| container_end_page | 1539 |
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| container_issue | 5 |
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| container_title | Journal of public economics |
| container_volume | 92 |
| creator | Kind, Hans Jarle Koethenbuerger, Marko Schjelderup, Guttorm |
| description | This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.010 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of public economics, 2008-06, Vol.92 (5), p.1531-1539 |
| issn | 0047-2727 1879-2316 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36877759 |
| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete - AutoHoldings; RePEc |
| subjects | Ad-valorem taxes D43 Economic efficiency H21 H22 Imperfect competition L13 Market theory Monopolies Optimal taxation Specific taxes Taxes Two-sided markets |
| title | Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets |
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