Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets

This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or posit...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of public economics 2008-06, Vol.92 (5), p.1531-1539
Hauptverfasser: Kind, Hans Jarle, Koethenbuerger, Marko, Schjelderup, Guttorm
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.
ISSN:0047-2727
1879-2316
DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.010