Candidates, campaigns, or partisan conditions? Re-evaluating strategic-politicians theory

According to strategic-politicians theory, political elites help ensure electoral responsiveness even when the mass public is deficient. Testing this theory requires measuring the effects of candidate experience and campaign spending, but one must confront endogeneity problems, because the theory re...

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Veröffentlicht in:Legislative studies quarterly 2007-08, Vol.XXXII (3), p.361-394
Hauptverfasser: Basinger, Scott J, Ensley, Michael J
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:According to strategic-politicians theory, political elites help ensure electoral responsiveness even when the mass public is deficient. Testing this theory requires measuring the effects of candidate experience and campaign spending, but one must confront endogeneity problems, because the theory requires potential candidates and campaign contributors to be responsive to district partisan conditions and national partisan tides. By applying an instrumental-variable method to control for selection bias, we found that challenger experience only matters indirectly, through its effect on campaign expenditures, but partisan context matters both directly and indirectly. We theorize that challenger experience is best understood as an informational shortcut: it signals incumbent vulnerability to potential campaign contributors. Reprinted by permission of the Comparative Legislative Research Center, University of Iowa
ISSN:0362-9805