Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games

Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibri...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economic theory 2007-02, Vol.30 (2), p.373-384
Hauptverfasser: Schulteis, Tim, Perea, Andres, Peters, Hans, Vermeulen, Dries
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economic theory
Equilibrium
Equilibrium models
Expected utility
EXPOSITA NOTE
Game theory
Games
Mixed strategy
Probability
Probability distributions
Revisions
Signalling
Studies
Utility functions
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Zusammenfassung:In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-005-0061-7