Pricing access in network competition

Pricing access in network competition

We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of regulatory economics 2007-02, Vol.31 (1), p.109-123
1. Verfasser: Mialon, Sue H
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Access charges
Collusion
Competition
Computer networks
Consumers
Cost control
Economic incentives
Economic management
Economic regulation
Efficiency
Equilibrium
Equilibrium models
Fees & charges
Incumbency
Industrial organization
Industrial pricing
Market access
Market shares
Monopolies
Network security
Opportunity costs
Pricing policies
Regulatory policy
Studies
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.
ISSN:0922-680X
1573-0468
DOI:10.1007/s11149-006-9009-5