Inflation inertia and credible disinflation
We develop a model of optimizing forward-looking staggered price setting where even fully credible disinflations display a delayed and gradual inflation response and significant output losses. There is a welfare trade-off between these output losses and the gains from smaller inflationary distortion...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of international economics 2007-09, Vol.73 (1), p.48-68 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | We develop a model of optimizing forward-looking staggered price setting where even fully credible disinflations display a delayed and gradual inflation response and significant output losses. There is a welfare trade-off between these output losses and the gains from smaller inflationary distortions. For reasonable parameter values disinflation improves welfare, and more so if it is phased in gradually. The pricing assumption of our model yields dynamics that are similar to models of sticky information, but its state space is much simpler, thereby allowing for the application of standard linearization methods. |
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ISSN: | 0022-1996 1873-0353 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.03.007 |