Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem

Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem

In a permit sharing problem, we investigate allocation schemes which are immune to manipulation where the information about technology is private. We show that among efficient solutions, there is no solution which satisfies Individual Rationality and Non-Manipulability via technology.

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2007-07, Vol.96 (1), p.103-108
Hauptverfasser: Shin, Sungwhee, Suh, Sang-Chul
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Efficiency
Individual Rationality
Information
Non-Manipulability
Permit sharing
Privacy
Public goods
Public services
Rationality
Technology
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In a permit sharing problem, we investigate allocation schemes which are immune to manipulation where the information about technology is private. We show that among efficient solutions, there is no solution which satisfies Individual Rationality and Non-Manipulability via technology.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.017