VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities

VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities

For mechanism design with independent values, we identify a subclass of Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanisms that induce efficient ex ante investments even with externalities. The Vickrey second price auction does not belong to this class.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2007-02, Vol.94 (2), p.192-196
Hauptverfasser: Krähmer, Daniel, Strausz, Roland
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Auctions
Efficient mechanisms
Ex ante investments
Externalities
Investment
Mechanism design
Second price auction
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:For mechanism design with independent values, we identify a subclass of Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanisms that induce efficient ex ante investments even with externalities. The Vickrey second price auction does not belong to this class.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.028