Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay

Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay

Prior work on long‐term contracts and the incentive to shirk has focused almost exclusively on Major League Baseball. The current inquiry is the first to examine shirking in the National Basketball Association. We employed two different measures of player productivity. When the NBA's measure is...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economic inquiry 2006-07, Vol.44 (3), p.536-546
Hauptverfasser: Berri, David J., Krautmann, Anthony C.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Analysis
Athletes
Data analysis
Economics of sport
Employee management relations
Employment
Financial incentives
Free agency
Hypotheses
Influence
Job performance
Labor contracts
Labor market
Labor productivity
Labour productivity
National Basketball Association
Productivity
Productivity incentives
Productivity measurement
Professional baseball
Professional basketball
Sports injuries
Studies
U.S.A
Wage payment systems
Wages & salaries
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Prior work on long‐term contracts and the incentive to shirk has focused almost exclusively on Major League Baseball. The current inquiry is the first to examine shirking in the National Basketball Association. We employed two different measures of player productivity. When the NBA's measure is used, we find evidence consistent with allegations of shirking behavior. But when productivity is measured in a fashion more consistent with economists' definition of marginal product, the evidence of shirking evaporates. (JEL J41, J44, L83)
ISSN:0095-2583
1465-7295
DOI:10.1093/ei/cbj033