No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game

No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game

To understand the evolution of social behavior, particularly among humans and other social mammals, it is important to know when natural selection can favor cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals. No pure strategy can be evolutionary stable in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

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Veröffentlicht in:Nature (London) 1987-05, Vol.327 (6117), p.58-59
Hauptverfasser: Boyd, Robert, Lorberbaum, Jeffrey P
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Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Behavior
Evolution
Mammals
Social behavior
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container_title Nature (London)
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creator Boyd, Robert
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description To understand the evolution of social behavior, particularly among humans and other social mammals, it is important to know when natural selection can favor cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals. No pure strategy can be evolutionary stable in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
doi_str_mv 10.1038/327058a0
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subjects Behavior
Evolution
Mammals
Social behavior
title No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
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