No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game

No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game

To understand the evolution of social behavior, particularly among humans and other social mammals, it is important to know when natural selection can favor cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals. No pure strategy can be evolutionary stable in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Nature (London) 1987-05, Vol.327 (6117), p.58-59
Hauptverfasser: Boyd, Robert, Lorberbaum, Jeffrey P
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Behavior
Evolution
Mammals
Social behavior
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Zusammenfassung:To understand the evolution of social behavior, particularly among humans and other social mammals, it is important to know when natural selection can favor cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals. No pure strategy can be evolutionary stable in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
ISSN:0028-0836
1476-4687
DOI:10.1038/327058a0