Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion

This paper develops a model of airport and airline competition in a three-stage game. We analyse incentives for vertical collusion between one airport and one airline that compete with another airport and another airline, by means of static and dynamic games. We find that incentives for collusion ex...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Transportation research. Part B: methodological 2009-12, Vol.43 (10), p.952-965
1. Verfasser:	Barbot, Cristina
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Air transportation and traffic Airport competition Airport competition Vertical collusion Applied sciences Exact sciences and technology Ground, air and sea transportation, marine construction Transportation planning, management and economics Vertical collusion
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	This paper develops a model of airport and airline competition in a three-stage game. We analyse incentives for vertical collusion between one airport and one airline that compete with another airport and another airline, by means of static and dynamic games. We find that incentives for collusion exist when airports and airlines have different market sizes and, under certain conditions, also when secondary airports and low cost airlines compete with main airports and full service airlines.
ISSN:	0191-2615 1879-2367
DOI:	10.1016/j.trb.2009.04.001