Formal foundations for hybrid hierarchies in GTRBAC
A role hierarchy defines permission acquisition and role-activation semantics through role--role relationships. It can be utilized for efficiently and effectively structuring functional roles of an organization having related access-control needs. The focus of this paper is the analysis of hybrid ro...
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Veröffentlicht in: | ACM transactions on information and system security 2008-01, Vol.10 (4), p.1-39 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | A role hierarchy defines permission acquisition and role-activation semantics through role--role relationships. It can be utilized for efficiently and effectively structuring functional roles of an organization having related access-control needs. The focus of this paper is the analysis of hybrid role hierarchies in the context of the
generalized temporal role-based access control
(GTRBAC) model that allows specification of a comprehensive set of temporal constraints on role, user-role, and role-permission assignments. We introduce the notion of
uniquely activable set
(UAS) associated with a role hierarchy that indicates the access capabilities of a user resulting from his membership to a role in the hierarchy. Identifying such a role set is essential, while making an authorization decision about whether or not a user should be allowed to activate a particular combination of roles in a single session. We formally show how UAS can be determined for a hybrid hierarchy. Furthermore, within a hybrid hierarchy, various hierarchical relations may be derived between an arbitrary pair of roles. We present a set of inference rules that can be used to generate all the possible derived relations that can be inferred from a specified set of hierarchical relations and show that it is
sound
and
complete
. We also present an analysis of hierarchy transformations with respect to role addition, deletion, and partitioning, and show how various cases of these transformations allow the original permission acquisition and role-activation semantics to be managed. The formal results presented here provide a basis for developing efficient security administration and management tools. |
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ISSN: | 1094-9224 1557-7406 |
DOI: | 10.1145/1284680.1284682 |