Renewable portfolio development in parallel with green industrial development policies towards the decarbonization targets of industrial gas producers in China

In order to reduce carbon emissions and promote the development of renewable energy in China, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, industrial gas producers (IGP) and power generation groups (PGG) is constructed by considering the policy mechanism of renewable portfolio standard (RPS) in parallel with industrial green development, and combining with the government's incentives and disincentives mechanism. Simulation analysis is carried out to explore the effects of different parameters on the cooperative transformation of enterprises under different governmental strategies. The results show that there is a mutual assistance mechanism between RPS and industrial green development, and the key lies in whether IGP and PGG can form a cooperative mechanism, while the government's incentives and disincentives mechanism is the key to promote the formation of cooperative mechanisms between the two parties. If the government adopts punitive measures, it should take into account the transformation costs of IGP and the scale of PGG, and if it adopts subsidy measures, it should give priority to helping enterprises with lower transformation costs, otherwise it will face greater financial pressure. The compatibility of IGP and PGG is the key to determining whether the two sides can realize the transformation. •Policy mechanism is considered for RPS in parallel with industrial green development.•The evolutionary paths are revealed under government incentives and disincentives.•Cooperative transformation exists between industrial gas producers and power generation groups.•Government incentives and disincentives is a prerequisite for cooperative transformation.•Compatibility between enterprises determines successful cooperative transformation.