Political courage needed to prevent the next pandemic

In 2024 (as of May 30), there have been ten reported cases of human infection with HPAI A(H5N1) globally, with three of these in the USA following exposure to infected dairy cows.2 Discovered almost three decades ago, since 2003 health authorities have reported 891 human cases of infection with HPAI A(H5N1), with half of the infected individuals dying.3 Although the risk of transmission to the general public remains low,4 alarms are now raised due to a surge in infections in multiple mammal species that has increased the risk of virus mutation and a leap to sustained transmission between people.5 HPAI A(H5N1) could potentially kill millions of individuals worldwide. Initiatives such as the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, or PIP framework, are likely insufficient to rebalance this equation.10 Beyond vaccines, access to diagnostics, treatments,11 and personal protective equipment will also be crucial to stop outbreaks and for pandemic response. Having clarity on where these countermeasures reside, who has stockpiles, and who does not is essential, yet today this information is not transparently available. [...]there is still much work to do—starting today—to ensure every region is on a path towards self-sufficiency with its own research, development, and manufacturing capacities for vaccines, diagnostics, and treatments. The premise of some vocal people and politicians—that the proposal to contribute to a WHO medical countermeasures stockpile would rob people of their rightful share of diagnostics, vaccines, or treatments—deserves re-evaluation.19 Pathogen access and benefit-sharing should result in a WHO-coordinated stockpile that ensures medical countermeasures are directed towards people most at risk in real-time in a public health emergency, no matter which country they live in.