Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects

Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects

The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Behavioral and brain sciences 2022-01, Vol.45, p.e240-e240, Article e240
Hauptverfasser: Sher, Shlomi, McKenzie, Craig R. M.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Behavioral Sciences
Humans
Open Peer Commentary
Rationality
Values
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Zusammenfassung:The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.
ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X2200111X