Exploring the EPR system for power battery recycling from a supply-side perspective: An evolutionary game analysis

[Display omitted] •Evolutionary game in the supply-side perspective of reverse supply chain.•Static reward and punishment mechanisms show cyclical behavior patterns.•Emphasis on a combination of dynamic incentives and punitive measures.•The impact of recovery costs and third-party interference is discussed. As a core component of new energy vehicle development, power battery will bring serious environmental pollution if it is not disposed of in a standardized way after retirement, so a scientific recycling mechanism is the key to achieve sustainable development. This paper explores the EPR mechanism of power battery recycling from a supply-side perspective based on a game theory approach. The system dynamics evolution model was constructed using Vensim software. Model testing, reward and punishment mechanism design and analysis of key parameters changes were carried out. The results show that the initial state of tripartite strategy choice is not conducive to the positive operation of reverse supply chain. The curve gradually fluctuates toward positive strategy side after the introduction of static reward and punishment mechanism, at which time the three parties show a cyclical behavior pattern. The dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can make consumers and almost 97% of the new energy vehicle manufacturers (NEVMs) participate in the environmental protection of power battery recycling, which has a better effect. In addition, the high cost of recycling will prevent a higher percentage of NEVMs from participating in supply chain construction. At the same time, the recycling price raised by private enterprises and small workshops is also one of the key factors that interfere with the participation of supply-side groups in formal recycling.