Reimagining Pharmaceutical Market Exclusivities: Should the Duration of Guaranteed Monopoly Periods Be Value Based?
To describe the main features of a pharmaceutical market in which the duration of guaranteed monopoly periods would correspond to a new pharmaceutical product’s value. After reviewing patent and regulatory exclusivity-based mechanisms for protecting prescription drug markets from competition to ince...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Value in health 2021-09, Vol.24 (9), p.1328-1334 |
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Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | To describe the main features of a pharmaceutical market in which the duration of guaranteed monopoly periods would correspond to a new pharmaceutical product’s value.
After reviewing patent and regulatory exclusivity-based mechanisms for protecting prescription drug markets from competition to incentivize drug innovation in developed countries, we model market protection mechanisms within the current framework to give the longest-lasting market protections to drug developers that bring the most affordable products to market with highest public health and clinical value.
An approach tying pharmaceutical market exclusivity to value would have 3 main features. First, it would be based on regulatory exclusivity (ie, the drug regulator refrains from authorizing generic entry for a certain amount of time), rather than patents. Second, the duration of exclusivity period would be pegged to the magnitude of a product’s anticipated health impact and its proposed price by using modified methods from the field of health technology assessment. Third, the duration of the value-based exclusivity period would be reassessed routinely 3 years after the product’s launch to account for its real-world effectiveness.
Linking a drug’s proposed price to the duration of its regulatory-based exclusivities would both incentivize the development of high impact, low-cost products and motivate drug developers to introduce these products at lower prices.
•The amount of time in which brand pharmaceutical markets are protected does not correspond with the products’ potential health impact or price.•We outline an alternative system that assigns the duration of exclusive market time protected by the regulatory authority as a function of a product’s value.•Our proposal provides a vision for how the current innovation system could be modified to leverage its strengths while leaving behind its weaknesses. |
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ISSN: | 1098-3015 1524-4733 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jval.2021.04.1277 |