Implicit and inferred: on the philosophical positions informing assessment science

Assessment practices have been increasingly informed by a range of philosophical positions. While generally beneficial, the addition of options can lead to misalignment in the philosophical assumptions associated with different features of assessment (e.g., the nature of constructs and competence, ways of assessing, validation approaches). Such incompatibility can threaten the quality and defensibility of researchers’ claims, especially when left implicit. We investigated how authors state and use their philosophical positions when designing and reporting on performance-based assessments (PBA) of intrinsic roles, as well as the (in)compatibility of assumptions across assessment features. Using a representative sample of studies examining PBA of intrinsic roles, we used qualitative content analysis to extract data on how authors enacted their philosophical positions across three key assessment features: (1) construct conceptualizations, (2) assessment activities, and (3) validation methods. We also examined patterns in philosophical positioning across features and studies. In reviewing 32 papers from established peer-reviewed journals, we found (a) authors rarely reported their philosophical positions, meaning underlying assumptions could only be inferred; (b) authors approached features of assessment in variable ways that could be informed by or associated with different philosophical assumptions; (c) we experienced uncertainty in determining (in)compatibility of philosophical assumptions across features. Authors’ philosophical positions were often vague or absent in the selected contemporary assessment literature. Leaving such details implicit may lead to misinterpretation by knowledge users wishing to implement, build on, or evaluate the work. As such, assessing claims, quality and defensibility, may increasingly depend more on who is interpreting, rather than what is being interpreted.