Neural Correlates of Perceptual Grouping Under Conditions of Inattention and Divided Attention

Grouping local elements of the visual environment together is crucial for meaningful perception. While our attentional system facilitates perception, it is limited in that we are unaware of some aspects of our environment that can still influence how we experience it. In this study, the neural mecha...

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Veröffentlicht in:Perception (London) 2020-05, Vol.49 (5), p.495-514
Hauptverfasser: Carther-Krone, Tiffany A., Lawrence-Dewar, Jane M., Shomstein, Sarah, Nah, Joseph C., Collegio, Andrew J., Marotta, Jonathan J.
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Grouping local elements of the visual environment together is crucial for meaningful perception. While our attentional system facilitates perception, it is limited in that we are unaware of some aspects of our environment that can still influence how we experience it. In this study, the neural mechanisms underlying the Ponzo illusion were examined under inattention and divided-attention conditions using functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the brain regions responsible for accessing visual stimuli. A line discrimination task was performed in which two horizontal lines were superimposed on a background of black and white dots that, on occasion, induced the Ponzo illusion if perceptually grouped together. Our findings revealed activation for perceptual grouping in the frontal, parietal, and occipital regions of the brain and activation in the bilateral frontal, temporal, and cingulate gyrus in response to divided attention compared with inattention trials. A direct comparison between grouping and attention showed involvement of the right supramarginal gyrus in grouping specifically under conditions of inattention, suggesting that even during implicit grouping complex visual processing occurs. Given that much of the visual world is not represented in conscious perception, these findings provide crucial information about how we make sense of visual scenes in the world.
ISSN:0301-0066
1468-4233
DOI:10.1177/0301006620912134