Research on information disclosure strategies of electricity retailers under new electricity reform in China

The Chinese government has issued “No.9 document” to start a new round of reform. Retail competition mechanism has been launched and more participants are encouraged to involve into the sell side. However, the electricity retail market is still imperfect and needs continuously improving at current s...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Science of the total environment 2020-03, Vol.710, p.136382-136382, Article 136382
Hauptverfasser: Jin, Luosong, Chen, Cheng, Wang, Xiangyang, Yu, Jing, Long, Houyin
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The Chinese government has issued “No.9 document” to start a new round of reform. Retail competition mechanism has been launched and more participants are encouraged to involve into the sell side. However, the electricity retail market is still imperfect and needs continuously improving at current stage, in which information disclosure mechanism is of great significance. This paper analyzes and compares the information disclosure strategies of power retailers under new electricity reform in China. The results show that the retail companies with better service quality are more inclined to disclose information, while sellers with poor service quality tend to hide information. Information non-transparency will result in some inefficiencies inevitably and perfect information disclosure system is expected to promote competition, thus ensuring market fairness. These findings may provide some references for the future development of the electricity retail market and electricity reform. [Display omitted] •Information disclosure mechanism is of great significance to the retail market.•We study the different strategies of power retailers under new electricity reform.•Retails with good service quality behave differently from sellers with poor quality.
ISSN:0048-9697
1879-1026
DOI:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.136382