The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion revisited

Perry Hendricks has recently presented the impairment argument for the immorality of abortion, to which I responded and he has now replied. The argument is based on the premise that impairing a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and on the principle that if impairing an organism is immoral, impairing it to a higher degree is also—the impairment principle. If abortion impairs a fetus to a higher degree, then this principle entails abortion is immoral. In my reply, I argued that abortion does not impair an organism in the way fetal alcohol syndrome does, and showed that interest theorists can avoid the argument. Hendricks has responded to my criticisms by demonstrating how abortion does impair an organism. In this reply, I acknowledge Hendricks’ point, but proceed to criticize the application of the impairment principle to abortion, showing that it is invalid if we accept his explanation for why inflicting fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. I also argue that counter‐examples show the impairment principle itself to be dubitable, concluding that the impairment argument remains unpersuasive.