Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf
In their chapter "Legacy of Nebuchadnezzar," the authors place [Saddam Hussein] in the context of some brutal predecessors. Without any amateur psychoanalysis, Saddam is portrayed as a creature of his country's violent history. Restive the Shi'i majority has been, Saddam has show...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Washington report on Middle East affairs 1991-02, Vol.IX (9), p.73 |
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Format: | Magazinearticle |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | In their chapter "Legacy of Nebuchadnezzar," the authors place [Saddam Hussein] in the context of some brutal predecessors. Without any amateur psychoanalysis, Saddam is portrayed as a creature of his country's violent history. Restive the Shi'i majority has been, Saddam has shown that he could repress their dissent. In the piece on the long Iranian war, the authors state that toppling the Tehran government and bottling up export of the Ayatollah's brand of fundamentalism was one of Saddam's lesser aims. Retaking the half of the Shatt Al-Arab which he had ceded to Iran was his main goal. In assessing the events that preceded the August invasion, Saddam's actions indeed seemed designed to telegraph his ultimate intentions. Execution of the Iranian-born British journalist Farzad Bazoft, the seemingly weekly discovery of parts needed for nuclear weapons, massing troops near the Kuwaiti border, and Saddam's own threat to "resort to effective action" if he didn't receive cash and satisfaction over the Rumaila oil fields, all seemed aimed at warning the powers of the coming invasion. |
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ISSN: | 8755-4917 2163-2782 |