Social Cognition 2.0: An Interactive Memory Systems Account

For 40 years, research on impression formation and attitudes has relied on dual-process theories that represent knowledge in a single associative network. Although such models explain priming effects and some implicit responses, they are generally silent on other forms of learning and on the interface of social cognition with perception and action. Meanwhile, advances in cognitive neuroscience reveal multiple, interacting forms of learning and memory (e.g., semantic associative memory, Pavlovian conditioning, and instrumental learning), with detailed models of their operations, neural bases, and connections with perceptual and behavioral systems. This memory systems perspective offers a more refined, neurally plausible model of social cognition and attitudes that, I argue, provides a useful and generative account of human social behavior. To date, research on impression formation and attitudes has relied on dual-process theories in which knowledge is represented in a single associative network. Classic dual-process models explain priming effects and concept learning, but have trouble explaining how attitudes and impressions relate to affect, action, and perception. Meanwhile, advances in cognitive neuroscience reveal multiple, interacting forms of learning and memory, with detailed models of their operations and neural bases. This memory systems perspective offers a more refined, neurally plausible model of social cognition and attitudes that suggests a more precise and generative account of human social behavior.