Reason After Revelation: Karl Barth on Divine Word and Human Words

Though little understood, Karl Barth's moral theology is widely criticized. Indeed, it is so widely criticized because it is so little understood. Among ethicists, the principal objects of criticism are Barth's account of practical reason and the account of revelation on which it depends. This essay argues that such criticisms miss their mark, because they rest on an incomplete understanding of Barth's doctrine of the Word of God that results in an incorrect understanding of his doctrine of divine command. Because critics neglect his account of subjective reception of revelation through which divine command is heard, they ignore the account of disputation, deliberation, and decision present in his account of scriptural interpretation and ecclesial confession. By laying out the discursive practices of scriptural interpretation and ecclesial confession, and by drawing out the deliberative dimensions of Kantian self‐legislation and Hegelian mutual recognition at work in interpretation and confession alike, this essay argues that these practices provide a fuller account of what Barth calls “practical casuistry,” as well as his most fulsome and winsome account of practical reason.