Biological Criteria of Disease: Four Ways of Going Wrong

We defend a view of the distinction between the normal and the pathological according to which that distinction has an objective, biological component. We accept that there is a normative component to the concept of disease, especially as applied to human beings. Nevertheless, an organism cannot be...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of medicine and philosophy 2017-08, Vol.42 (4), p.447-466
Hauptverfasser: Matthewson, John, Griffiths, Paul E
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We defend a view of the distinction between the normal and the pathological according to which that distinction has an objective, biological component. We accept that there is a normative component to the concept of disease, especially as applied to human beings. Nevertheless, an organism cannot be in a pathological state unless something has gone wrong for that organism from a purely biological point of view. Biology, we argue, recognises two sources of biological normativity, which jointly generate four "ways of going wrong" from a biological perspective. These findings show why previous attempts to provide objective criteria for pathology have fallen short: Biological science recognizes a broader range of ways in which living things can do better or worse than has previously been recognized in the philosophy of medicine.
ISSN:0360-5310
1744-5019
DOI:10.1093/jmp/jhx004