Notions of equilibrium for differential games on intersecting game sets

We suggest new notions of conflict equilibrium and demonstrate a technique of their use for finding a solution in arbitrary game problems on a game set common for all players and especially in problems with side interests of players in the static and dynamic settings.

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Veröffentlicht in:Differential equations 2016-11, Vol.52 (11), p.1469-1480
1. Verfasser: Smol’yakov, E. R.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We suggest new notions of conflict equilibrium and demonstrate a technique of their use for finding a solution in arbitrary game problems on a game set common for all players and especially in problems with side interests of players in the static and dynamic settings.
ISSN:0012-2661
1608-3083
DOI:10.1134/S0012266116110082