MODELLING SOCIAL ENTERPRISES

MODELLING SOCIAL ENTERPRISES

We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. We focus on workers' cooperatives, but our conclusions apply also to employment-constrained profit maximizers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we prove that the horizontal merger...

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Veröffentlicht in:Annals of public and cooperative economics 2016-12, Vol.87 (4), p.529-539
Hauptverfasser: Delbono, Flavio, Lambertini, Luca
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Acquisitions & mergers
Capital
Co-operatives
Economic models
Economic theory
Horizontal integration
Incentives
Labour economics
Monopolies
Oligopoly
Profit maximization
Studies
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Zusammenfassung:We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. We focus on workers' cooperatives, but our conclusions apply also to employment-constrained profit maximizers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we prove that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately efficient for insiders as well as for outsiders; (ii) socially efficient if market size is large enough, even in the case of merger to monopoly. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers
ISSN:1370-4788