Corruption control

How can we explain why countries that apply similar remedies against corruption vary so much in their actual incidence of corruption? While high penalties for business crime may prevent corruption in some situations, it may exacerbate the problem in others. We find enforcement of laws against corrup...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Crime, law, and social change law, and social change, 2016-09, Vol.66 (2), p.147-163
Hauptverfasser:	Moene, Karl, Søreide, Tina
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Access to information Bank robberies Bribery Cooperation Corruption Corruption in government Crime prevention Criminal law Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law Criminology and Criminal Justice Economic growth Elgar, Edward Finance Fines & penalties GDP Gross Domestic Product Interdisciplinary aspects International cooperation Law and Criminology Law enforcement Low income groups Management Political Science Politics Public opinion surveys Social Sciences Studies White collar crime
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Zusammenfassung:	How can we explain why countries that apply similar remedies against corruption vary so much in their actual incidence of corruption? While high penalties for business crime may prevent corruption in some situations, it may exacerbate the problem in others. We find enforcement of laws against corruption to depend on the form of cooperation between layers of law enforcement authority in the state administration. Small local differences in honesty and cooperation may lead to large differences in effective law enforcement and in actual levels of corruption.
ISSN:	0925-4994 1573-0751
DOI:	10.1007/s10611-016-9618-6