Joint games and compatibility

We introduce the concepts of joint games and compatibility. In a joint game, members of the grand coalition have the option to split and participate in different underlying games, thereby maximizing their total worths. In order to determine whether the grand coalition will remain intact, we introduc...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic theory 2016-01, Vol.61 (1), p.91-113
Hauptverfasser:	Assa, Hirbod, Elliston, Sheridon, Lehrer, Ehud
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Coalitions Consortia Cooperative games Economic games Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Endowments Game Theory Games Induction assumption Market games Mathematical functions Microeconomics Public Finance Research Article Semigroups Social and Behav. Sciences Studies Sufficient conditions
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	We introduce the concepts of joint games and compatibility. In a joint game, members of the grand coalition have the option to split and participate in different underlying games, thereby maximizing their total worths. In order to determine whether the grand coalition will remain intact, we introduce the notion of compatibility of these games. A set of games is compatible if the core of the joint game is non-empty. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility.
ISSN:	0938-2259 1432-0479
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0