Decentralization, institutions, and maritime piracy

Piracy is an organized crime that is not politically motivated; however, piracy has been linked consistently to the political environment and the quality of national institutions. Provincial governance considerations and spatial aspects may influence the emergence and sustainability of piratical activities. Unlike the extant literature, we investigate the impact of fiscal and political decentralization on the incidence of piracy, while accounting for the average distance to the coast of the nearest region to the pirate incident. Fiscal decentralization generally serves as a deterrent to piracy, while political decentralization may encourage or inhibit piracy. Political decentralization may deter piracy by providing policy ownership to local officials. Alternatively, decentralization may foster piracy by inhibiting interjurisdictional competition or by separating local governance from the national seat of power. In general, enhanced institutional quality limits piracy at both national and regional levels.