Rule-Based Reasoning Is Fast and Belief-Based Reasoning Can Be Slow: Challenging Current Explanations of Belief-Bias and Base-Rate Neglect

It is commonly assumed that belief-based reasoning is fast and automatic, whereas rule-based reasoning is slower and more effortful. Dual-Process theories of reasoning rely on this speed-asymmetry explanation to account for a number of reasoning phenomena, such as base-rate neglect and belief-bias....

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition memory, and cognition, 2017-07, Vol.43 (7), p.1154-1170
Hauptverfasser: Newman, Ian R., Gibb, Maia, Thompson, Valerie A.
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:It is commonly assumed that belief-based reasoning is fast and automatic, whereas rule-based reasoning is slower and more effortful. Dual-Process theories of reasoning rely on this speed-asymmetry explanation to account for a number of reasoning phenomena, such as base-rate neglect and belief-bias. The goal of the current study was to test this hypothesis about the relative speed of belief-based and rule-based processes. Participants solved base-rate problems (Experiment 1) and conditional inferences (Experiment 2) under a challenging deadline; they then gave a second response in free time. We found that fast responses were informed by rules of probability and logical validity, and that slow responses incorporated belief-based information. Implications for Dual-Process theories and future research options for dissociating Type I and Type II processes are discussed.
ISSN:0278-7393
1939-1285
DOI:10.1037/xlm0000372