Energy Efficient Short Term Spectrum Auction Using the Concept of Green Payments

This work seeks to demonstrate the economic importance of short-term spectrum auction and how it can be implemented with fewer overheads. This can be achieved using the proposed market driven sealed bid spectrum auction process with a novel concept called the green payment. The green payment serves as an incentive during the auction process to encourage the users to use the radio spectrum in an efficient manner. The model proposes to tax users that are not power efficient while those that are power efficient pay a subsidy during the auction process. First, the appropriate bidding and auction periods are examined and determined such that the bidding period is dependent on the traffic load in the system. Using the obtained bidding period, the value of the green payments is then examined and the appropriate level of tax and subsidy are also determined. The economic importance of the model in terms of the revenue generation for the service provider and in terms of the tax being adequate to finance the subsidy is also examined. These results show that using the proposed concept of green payment, the energy consumed and the system delay can be reduced when compared to a non-green payment based auction process. The results also show that the proposed model is beneficial to the service provider in terms of increase in profit and that the tax and subsidy system is self-sustaining.