The peculiar economics of federal energy management

US federal agency energy managers face different constraints than do comparable private sector managers. They are faced with energy consumption goals mandated via legislation or directed via Presidential Executive Order that encourage if not compel them to invest more in energy efficiency or renewab...

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Veröffentlicht in:Energy policy 2016-04, Vol.91, p.268-272
1. Verfasser: Canes, Michael E.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:US federal agency energy managers face different constraints than do comparable private sector managers. They are faced with energy consumption goals mandated via legislation or directed via Presidential Executive Order that encourage if not compel them to invest more in energy efficiency or renewables than would be cost effective from a private sector perspective. To make such investments, they also are provided access to private capital that is additional to their agency budgets. The encouragement to invest beyond what is cost effective may be a source of waste in some instances, and the financing mechanisms appear more expensive than necessary. A rough estimate of the magnitude of the waste is offered, as well as a mechanism to reduce the costs of agency access to capital. •Legislative and regulatory initiatives that constrain federal agency energy investments.•Economic calculus facing a federal agency energy manager.•Magnitude of federal energy investments and of possible waste.•Financing mechanisms and how their costs might be reduced.
ISSN:0301-4215
1873-6777
DOI:10.1016/j.enpol.2015.12.043