Automata, Living and Non-Living: Descartes' Mechanical Biology and His Criteria for Life
Despite holding to the essential distinction between mind and body, Descartes did not adopt a life-body dualism. Though humans are the only creatures which can reason, as they are the only creatures whose body is in an intimate union with a soul, they are not the only finite beings who are alive. In...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Biology & philosophy 1998-04, Vol.13 (2), p.179-186 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Despite holding to the essential distinction between mind and body, Descartes did not adopt a life-body dualism. Though humans are the only creatures which can reason, as they are the only creatures whose body is in an intimate union with a soul, they are not the only finite beings who are alive. In the present note, I attempt to determine Descartes' criteria for something to be 'living.' Though certain passages associate such a principle with the presence of a properly functioning heart, I show that there are important reasons for also understanding life in terms of a degree of complexity of design.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
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ISSN: | 0169-3867 1572-8404 |
DOI: | 10.1023/A:1006502002257 |