A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking

Motivated by polar extremes of monopartisanship and nonpartisanship in existing literature on parties in legislatures, we introduce and analyze a more moderate theory of competitive partisan lawmaking. The distinguishing feature of competitive partisanship is that the minority party, although disadv...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Political science research and methods 2015-09, Vol.3 (3), p.423-448
Hauptverfasser: Krehbiel, Keith, Meirowitz, Adam, Wiseman, Alan E.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 448
container_issue 3
container_start_page 423
container_title Political science research and methods
container_volume 3
creator Krehbiel, Keith
Meirowitz, Adam
Wiseman, Alan E.
description Motivated by polar extremes of monopartisanship and nonpartisanship in existing literature on parties in legislatures, we introduce and analyze a more moderate theory of competitive partisan lawmaking. The distinguishing feature of competitive partisanship is that the minority party, although disadvantaged, has some guaranteed opportunities to influence lawmaking. Our analytic framework focuses on two dimensions of parties in legislatures: agenda-based competition, operationalized as a minority party right to make an amendment to the majority party’s proposal, and resource-based competition, characterized as the ability of both party leaders to use transferable resources when building winning or blocking coalitions. Building on the canonical model, we find that giving voice to the minority party in either one of these ways alone results in outcomes that, on the whole, are less lopsided and more moderate than those predicted by the existing monopartisan and nonpartisan theories.
doi_str_mv 10.1017/psrm.2014.41
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1761669918</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><cupid>10_1017_psrm_2014_41</cupid><sourcerecordid>1761669918</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c265t-ec5e2fb9b60ec98d8ad2f50718640f6de45a688230fd433352266acc4d1ec6de3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNptkE1LAzEQhoMoWGpv_oAFLyLumskm2eRYil9Q0EM9hzSb1NTuZk22Sv-9Wywi4lxmYJ55GR6EzgEXgKG66VJsCoKBFhSO0IhgKnNBhTz-mSt8iiYprfFQEjMu6QhdTbPFqw1xlwWXzULT2d73_sNmzzr2Puk2m-vPRr_5dnWGTpzeJDs59DF6ubtdzB7y-dP942w6zw3hrM-tYZa4pVxybI0UtdA1cQxXIDjFjteWMs2FICV2NS3LkhHCuTaG1mDNsC7H6PI7t4vhfWtTrxqfjN1sdGvDNimoOHAuJYgBvfiDrsM2tsN3CiQDCrySZKCuvykTQ0rROtVF3-i4U4DV3p3au1N7d4rCgBcHXDfL6OuV_ZX638EX87pviA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1951416792</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking</title><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>Cambridge University Press Journals Complete</source><creator>Krehbiel, Keith ; Meirowitz, Adam ; Wiseman, Alan E.</creator><creatorcontrib>Krehbiel, Keith ; Meirowitz, Adam ; Wiseman, Alan E.</creatorcontrib><description>Motivated by polar extremes of monopartisanship and nonpartisanship in existing literature on parties in legislatures, we introduce and analyze a more moderate theory of competitive partisan lawmaking. The distinguishing feature of competitive partisanship is that the minority party, although disadvantaged, has some guaranteed opportunities to influence lawmaking. Our analytic framework focuses on two dimensions of parties in legislatures: agenda-based competition, operationalized as a minority party right to make an amendment to the majority party’s proposal, and resource-based competition, characterized as the ability of both party leaders to use transferable resources when building winning or blocking coalitions. Building on the canonical model, we find that giving voice to the minority party in either one of these ways alone results in outcomes that, on the whole, are less lopsided and more moderate than those predicted by the existing monopartisan and nonpartisan theories.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2049-8470</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2049-8489</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2014.41</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press</publisher><subject>Coalitions ; Competition ; Constitutional Amendments ; Disadvantaged ; Legislative Bodies ; Legislators ; Legislatures ; Majorities ; Original Articles ; Partisanship ; Political leadership ; Political Parties ; Theory</subject><ispartof>Political science research and methods, 2015-09, Vol.3 (3), p.423-448</ispartof><rights>The European Political Science Association 2015</rights><rights>The European Political Science Association 2015</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c265t-ec5e2fb9b60ec98d8ad2f50718640f6de45a688230fd433352266acc4d1ec6de3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c265t-ec5e2fb9b60ec98d8ad2f50718640f6de45a688230fd433352266acc4d1ec6de3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2049847014000417/type/journal_article$$EHTML$$P50$$Gcambridge$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>164,314,780,784,12845,27924,27925,55628</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Krehbiel, Keith</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Meirowitz, Adam</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wiseman, Alan E.</creatorcontrib><title>A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking</title><title>Political science research and methods</title><addtitle>PSRM</addtitle><description>Motivated by polar extremes of monopartisanship and nonpartisanship in existing literature on parties in legislatures, we introduce and analyze a more moderate theory of competitive partisan lawmaking. The distinguishing feature of competitive partisanship is that the minority party, although disadvantaged, has some guaranteed opportunities to influence lawmaking. Our analytic framework focuses on two dimensions of parties in legislatures: agenda-based competition, operationalized as a minority party right to make an amendment to the majority party’s proposal, and resource-based competition, characterized as the ability of both party leaders to use transferable resources when building winning or blocking coalitions. Building on the canonical model, we find that giving voice to the minority party in either one of these ways alone results in outcomes that, on the whole, are less lopsided and more moderate than those predicted by the existing monopartisan and nonpartisan theories.</description><subject>Coalitions</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Constitutional Amendments</subject><subject>Disadvantaged</subject><subject>Legislative Bodies</subject><subject>Legislators</subject><subject>Legislatures</subject><subject>Majorities</subject><subject>Original Articles</subject><subject>Partisanship</subject><subject>Political leadership</subject><subject>Political Parties</subject><subject>Theory</subject><issn>2049-8470</issn><issn>2049-8489</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2015</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><recordid>eNptkE1LAzEQhoMoWGpv_oAFLyLumskm2eRYil9Q0EM9hzSb1NTuZk22Sv-9Wywi4lxmYJ55GR6EzgEXgKG66VJsCoKBFhSO0IhgKnNBhTz-mSt8iiYprfFQEjMu6QhdTbPFqw1xlwWXzULT2d73_sNmzzr2Puk2m-vPRr_5dnWGTpzeJDs59DF6ubtdzB7y-dP942w6zw3hrM-tYZa4pVxybI0UtdA1cQxXIDjFjteWMs2FICV2NS3LkhHCuTaG1mDNsC7H6PI7t4vhfWtTrxqfjN1sdGvDNimoOHAuJYgBvfiDrsM2tsN3CiQDCrySZKCuvykTQ0rROtVF3-i4U4DV3p3au1N7d4rCgBcHXDfL6OuV_ZX638EX87pviA</recordid><startdate>201509</startdate><enddate>201509</enddate><creator>Krehbiel, Keith</creator><creator>Meirowitz, Adam</creator><creator>Wiseman, Alan E.</creator><general>Cambridge University Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201509</creationdate><title>A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking</title><author>Krehbiel, Keith ; Meirowitz, Adam ; Wiseman, Alan E.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c265t-ec5e2fb9b60ec98d8ad2f50718640f6de45a688230fd433352266acc4d1ec6de3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2015</creationdate><topic>Coalitions</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Constitutional Amendments</topic><topic>Disadvantaged</topic><topic>Legislative Bodies</topic><topic>Legislators</topic><topic>Legislatures</topic><topic>Majorities</topic><topic>Original Articles</topic><topic>Partisanship</topic><topic>Political leadership</topic><topic>Political Parties</topic><topic>Theory</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Krehbiel, Keith</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Meirowitz, Adam</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wiseman, Alan E.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>Politics Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>ProQuest Politics Collection</collection><collection>Political Science Database</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Political science research and methods</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Krehbiel, Keith</au><au>Meirowitz, Adam</au><au>Wiseman, Alan E.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking</atitle><jtitle>Political science research and methods</jtitle><addtitle>PSRM</addtitle><date>2015-09</date><risdate>2015</risdate><volume>3</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>423</spage><epage>448</epage><pages>423-448</pages><issn>2049-8470</issn><eissn>2049-8489</eissn><abstract>Motivated by polar extremes of monopartisanship and nonpartisanship in existing literature on parties in legislatures, we introduce and analyze a more moderate theory of competitive partisan lawmaking. The distinguishing feature of competitive partisanship is that the minority party, although disadvantaged, has some guaranteed opportunities to influence lawmaking. Our analytic framework focuses on two dimensions of parties in legislatures: agenda-based competition, operationalized as a minority party right to make an amendment to the majority party’s proposal, and resource-based competition, characterized as the ability of both party leaders to use transferable resources when building winning or blocking coalitions. Building on the canonical model, we find that giving voice to the minority party in either one of these ways alone results in outcomes that, on the whole, are less lopsided and more moderate than those predicted by the existing monopartisan and nonpartisan theories.</abstract><cop>Cambridge, UK</cop><pub>Cambridge University Press</pub><doi>10.1017/psrm.2014.41</doi><tpages>26</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 2049-8470
ispartof Political science research and methods, 2015-09, Vol.3 (3), p.423-448
issn 2049-8470
2049-8489
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1761669918
source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Cambridge University Press Journals Complete
subjects Coalitions
Competition
Constitutional Amendments
Disadvantaged
Legislative Bodies
Legislators
Legislatures
Majorities
Original Articles
Partisanship
Political leadership
Political Parties
Theory
title A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-25T00%3A02%3A28IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20Theory%20of%20Competitive%20Partisan%20Lawmaking&rft.jtitle=Political%20science%20research%20and%20methods&rft.au=Krehbiel,%20Keith&rft.date=2015-09&rft.volume=3&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=423&rft.epage=448&rft.pages=423-448&rft.issn=2049-8470&rft.eissn=2049-8489&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/psrm.2014.41&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1761669918%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1951416792&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_cupid=10_1017_psrm_2014_41&rfr_iscdi=true