A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking
Motivated by polar extremes of monopartisanship and nonpartisanship in existing literature on parties in legislatures, we introduce and analyze a more moderate theory of competitive partisan lawmaking. The distinguishing feature of competitive partisanship is that the minority party, although disadv...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Political science research and methods 2015-09, Vol.3 (3), p.423-448 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Motivated by polar extremes of monopartisanship and nonpartisanship in
existing literature on parties in legislatures, we introduce and analyze a
more moderate theory of competitive partisan lawmaking. The
distinguishing feature of competitive partisanship is that the minority
party, although disadvantaged, has some guaranteed opportunities to
influence lawmaking. Our analytic framework focuses on two dimensions of
parties in legislatures: agenda-based competition,
operationalized as a minority party right to make an amendment to the
majority party’s proposal, and resource-based competition,
characterized as the ability of both party leaders to use transferable
resources when building winning or blocking coalitions. Building on the
canonical model, we find that giving voice to the minority party in either
one of these ways alone results in outcomes that, on the whole, are less
lopsided and more moderate than those predicted by the existing monopartisan
and nonpartisan theories. |
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ISSN: | 2049-8470 2049-8489 |
DOI: | 10.1017/psrm.2014.41 |